Monthly Discussion on Political Party Survival
March 15, 2007/ 20:08 | Filed in: MONTHLY DISCUSSION
On Thursday, the 22nd of March 2007 at 15.30 we are inviting Nicolaus Teguh Budiharjanto of the Jakarta-based Center for Strategic and Internasional Studies (CSIS), a Ph.D candidate at the Northern Illinois university, to our office to discuss the topic of political party survival in our monthly discussion. And as always the case with our forum, it is for only limited participants. So please confirm your participation either by phone at 021-7820-444 (work hour with Amel) or by email to INTERSEKSI AT GE-MAIL DOT COM.
The ability of former authoritarian parties to survive transitions to democracy is puzzling. We may expect discredited and disgraced elites and institutions to lose substantial power to new reformist elites and political parties, to end up in the dustbin of history as a memento of past abusive and repressive regimes. Yet, in some cases the individuals and social groups that underpinned the old regimes and their political party vehicles are able to survive and prosper in radically new political contexts characterized by democratic elections and consolidation processes.
Democratic transitions are complex, contentious, and multidimensional processes in which players multiply, parties proliferate, and interests diversify. Reformist political parties emerge and many new local or communal parties are established to channel the aspirations of particular groups. All compete to gain support from previously non-mobilized electorates. Often, elites from the former regime establish new parties to secure their political existence or to protect their interests. Typically, these contexts are marked by party hopping and opportunistic behavior.
The pressures on political parties to devise successful electoral strategies and to use their existing assets optimally are intense. Small parties may mobilize local or ethno-communal identities and symbolic power to win votes. Some may emphasize a distinct platform or party ideology as an effective way to appeal to electorates. Other parties cultivate support from business interests to tap money to finance campaigns, mobilize supporters, broaden territorial penetration, and, if possible, to buy votes. These varying strategic choices, however, do not seem to explain the divergent fortunes among formerly dominant parties in coping with fundamentally transformed political and institutional contexts. Rather, the ability of such parties to prosper under these new conditions seems to be linked to their abilities to exploit, sustain, and expand clientelistic mass and oligarchic linkages.
The ability of former authoritarian parties to survive transitions to democracy is puzzling. We may expect discredited and disgraced elites and institutions to lose substantial power to new reformist elites and political parties, to end up in the dustbin of history as a memento of past abusive and repressive regimes. Yet, in some cases the individuals and social groups that underpinned the old regimes and their political party vehicles are able to survive and prosper in radically new political contexts characterized by democratic elections and consolidation processes.
Democratic transitions are complex, contentious, and multidimensional processes in which players multiply, parties proliferate, and interests diversify. Reformist political parties emerge and many new local or communal parties are established to channel the aspirations of particular groups. All compete to gain support from previously non-mobilized electorates. Often, elites from the former regime establish new parties to secure their political existence or to protect their interests. Typically, these contexts are marked by party hopping and opportunistic behavior.
The pressures on political parties to devise successful electoral strategies and to use their existing assets optimally are intense. Small parties may mobilize local or ethno-communal identities and symbolic power to win votes. Some may emphasize a distinct platform or party ideology as an effective way to appeal to electorates. Other parties cultivate support from business interests to tap money to finance campaigns, mobilize supporters, broaden territorial penetration, and, if possible, to buy votes. These varying strategic choices, however, do not seem to explain the divergent fortunes among formerly dominant parties in coping with fundamentally transformed political and institutional contexts. Rather, the ability of such parties to prosper under these new conditions seems to be linked to their abilities to exploit, sustain, and expand clientelistic mass and oligarchic linkages.